Probative Inquiry into the
2023 Financial Sector Stress Events
Key Findings
| 1. | SVB failed in 2023 because it suffered massive losses when interest rates rose, its depositors ran, and it had insufficient contingent-liquidity readiness. |
| 2. | By June 2022 at the latest, and perhaps as early as March, Federal Reserve supervisory staff knew, or should have known, that SVB was highly vulnerable to massive losses and a potentially ruinous run. |
| 3. | Despite that awareness, Board S&R and FRBSF supervisors did not require SVB to reduce its interest-rate risk or exposure to runs by uninsured depositors. |
| 4. | Their failure to do so did not result from the 2018 tailoring statute (EGRRCPA) or a less assertive supervisory culture promoted by the implementation of related policy priorities. |
| 5. | Board S&R has featured a culture of uncertainty regarding decision-making authority that dates back decades, and which is directly implicated in its failure to take decisive action at SVB. |
| 6. | Emphasis on collegial decision-making through committees fosters inaction due to a divorcing of responsibility, authority, and accountability across the Federal Reserve supervisory system. |
| 7. | Social media did not fuel the run at SVB: if “social media” is understood to imply platforms like Twitter, chatter regarding the run at SVB began after it was well underway; and if “fueled” is meant to imply either ‘triggering’ or ‘accelerating’ the run, then close analysis of time-stamped Twitter data disconfirms either interpretation. |
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