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<p><font color="#14ABB2">Probative Inquiry into the <br>2023 Financial Sector Stress Events</font></p><p><font size ="6"><font color="#455664">Opening Letter</font></font></p>

Probative Inquiry into the
2023 Financial Sector Stress Events

Opening Letter

by Starling Insights

Starling Insights Editorial Board

Sep 21, 2026

Feature

Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”) failed on March 10th 2023. In the time since, a causal narrative has been asserted by official sector post-mortem studies and the public commentary that these studies have subsequently informed. Public policy formulation is now often influenced by this narrative.

Starling was retained to: (1) conduct an independent Probative Inquiry into any lapses in supervision that may have contributed to SVB’s failure; (2) test the reliability of the established public narrative; (3) produce an Independent Expert Review setting forth the understandings and conclusions that our Probative Inquiry supports; and based thereupon, (4) to articulate Recommendations for Reform in supervisory practice, if any supervisory lapses evident in 2023 are to be avoided going forward.

This Preliminary Report summarizes initial findings of fact established through our ongoing Probative Inquiry. Its principal conclusion is that the established public narrative is insufficiently substantiated by past official sector postmortem accounts to inform public policy formulation uncritically.

Days after the failure of SVB, Michael Barr, then the Vice Chair for Supervision (“VCS”) of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board”), directed Board staff to produce an internal review of the bank’s failure. Only seven-weeks later, that study (the “Barr Report”) was published. In a covering letter, VCS Barr highlighted the report’s four key findings:

  • “Silicon Valley Bank’s board of directors and management failed to manage their risks.”
  • “Supervisors did not fully appreciate the extent of the vulnerabilities as Silicon Valley Bank grew in size and complexity.”
  • “When supervisors did identify vulnerabilities, they did not take sufficient steps to ensure that Silicon Valley Bank fixed those problems quickly enough.”
  • “The Board’s tailoring approach in response to the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA) and a shift in the stance of supervisory policy impeded effective supervision by reducing standards, increasing complexity, and promoting a less assertive supervisory approach.”1

Barr also invited feedback on his report and further reviews of SVB’s failure:

  • “I also appreciate that others will have their own perspectives on this episode. We welcome external reviews of SVB’s failure, as well as congressional oversight, and we intend to take these into account as we make changes to our framework of bank supervision and regulation to ensure that the banking system remains strong and resilient.”2

In a June 2023 speech, then-Governor Michelle W. Bowman called for “an independent third party” review of the failures at SVB, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank. She noted that these failures “highlighted key deficiencies in risk management practices” and “key deficiencies in supervisory priorities.” Bowman argued that an independent review was necessary because the Barr Report was “prepared internally, by Federal Reserve [Board] supervision staff, relying on a limited number of unattributed source interviews, and completed on an expedited timeframe with a limited scope.” 

Bowman further observed that the Barr Report was “the product of one Board Member [that] was not reviewed by the other members of the Board prior to its publication.” More troublingly, in her view, “other Board members were afforded no ability to contribute to the report’s content.” She thus argued that, “[a] supplemental, independent review would help overcome the limitations of scope and timing of these initial efforts, and address concerns about the impartiality and independence of the reviews.”3

On June 4th 2025 Bowman was confirmed by the Senate as Vice Chair for Supervision. During her confirmation hearings, Bowman was asked whether, if confirmed as VCS, she would commit to an independent review of SVB’s failure and supervisory lapses. “I would like to do an independent review that would help us identify some of the issues that we should be identifying,” she replied. Starling’s Probative Inquiry is designed as a first step in the fulfillment of that pledge. 

Starling is well-known for curating a global dialogue4 aimed at advancing culture risk governance and supervision. We have argued that advances in governance5 must be achieved if we are to reverse the erosion of trust in private sector institutions that followed from the Global Financial Crisis, and that corollary advances in supervision6 must be achieved if supervisors are to overcome challenges to their perceived reliability after the banking sector turmoil of 2023. These views are deeply informed by my experience leading internal investigations and conducting risk intelligence exercises for public and private sector clients, across dozens of countries, over 25-years.

Mindful of the reputation for rigor and candor that this professional history imparts, VCS Bowman directed Starling to conduct a deep study of potential deficiencies in the supervision of SVB, by the staff of the Board’s Division of Supervision & Regulation (“Board S&R”) and the supervisory staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (“FRBSF”). In this, we have sought to determine whether supervisory staff might have acted to prevent or mitigate that bank failure and, if so, to learn what may have impeded timely remedial action. We have also sought to explore whether Board and/or FRBSF supervisory staff – or their leadership – may unintentionally have contributed to the run on SVB and, if so, how this unintended outcome came to be. Our purpose in all the foregoing is to develop constructive learnings that may inform improved future practices. 

In pursuing these learnings, we benefit by the work done by those who compiled the Barr Report and other postmortem studies. We further enjoy the benefit of hindsight and a more generous timeframe within which to conduct our study than other post-mortem writers were afforded.

In conducting our Probative Inquiry, we have had access to summary interview notes for all the people interviewed by the writers of the Barr Report. We have also conducted our own interviews with key Board S&R officers involved in the supervision of SVB, with the notable exception of the former Division Director, and the former Deputy Director for Supervision, both of whom declined multiple invitations to contribute to our constructive efforts. Nor have we been able to engage the former head of the Large & Foreign Banking Organization supervisory portfolio which had direct oversight responsibility for SVB at the time of its failure.

Starling has benefitted by interviews with those entrusted with the duties of the VCS: former Governor Daniel K. Tarullo, former VCS Randal K. Quarles, and current VCS Michelle W. Bowman. Governor Barr, who served as VCS during the nine months immediately prior to SVB’s failure, declined to meet for an interview discussion until after having opportunity to respond to written questions. I appreciate Governor Barr’s responses to an initial set of questions, his willingness to respond to a more detailed second set of questions recently submitted, and I look forward to an interview discussion with him that is to be scheduled thereafter.

In this Preliminary Report, we recount the learnings achieved through our interview discussions with former Governor Tarullo and former VCS Quarles. Learnings obtained through our engagement with VCS Bowman and Governor Barr will feature in a subsequent Interim Report, along with learnings Starling gained through interviews with other Board S&R and FRBSF staff conducted after the July 6th 2026 cut-off date for the content captured here.

In the pages that follow, we identify and review potential deficiencies in the supervision of SVB by Board S&R and FRBSF supervisory staff. To allow the public to judge the credibility of our findings, we have described the evidence on which each finding is grounded. This Preliminary Report is supported by an Appendix featuring over three-hundred pages of evidence, and we provide references to various public and confidential documents that have informed the understandings expressed herein. 

We find it notable that, in the production of the Barr Report and other postmortem studies into the failure of SVB (e.g., by the Fed’s Office of the Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office), the preparers of those studies elected not to interview nor to issue document requests to the former board or management of SVB. We view that as a failure to solicit a valuable perspective. While the past board and management of SVB are surely interested parties, prone to a self-favoring bias, this is true also of the Board S&R and FRBSF supervisory staff whose accounts form the basis of the conclusions set forth in the Barr Report and, therefore, the public narrative it helped to establish.

In an effort to curate a more complete account of the events that culminated in the failure of SVB, Starling interviewed Mary Miller, a former Treasury official in the Obama Administration, who served as the chair of the audit committee of SVB’s board of directors. And we interviewed Mark Watson, who joined SVB as Head of Management Governance in September 2022, after a long career in regulatory consulting. Summaries of those interviews appear in our Appendix to this Preliminary Report, along with a detailed written statement by the former Independent Directors of SVB, offering their account of events relevant to our Probative Inquiry. The Directors’ Statement is also attached as an addendum hereto.7

The Appendix also includes two detailed studies, prepared by independent experts with Charles River Associates, commissioned by Starling to examine: 

(1) what vulnerabilities at SVB were evident to market participants in the few years immediately prior to its failure – vulnerabilities that should therefore have been evident to the bank’s supervisors, given their access to far more granular, non-market information; and 

(2) whether an analysis of posts on Twitter in the period immediately prior to the failure of SVB supports the assertion that social media fueled the run on the bank. 

These studies make plain that the vulnerabilities at SVB were well understood by market participants, should have been evident to supervisors, and that assertions that social media chatter caused or meaningfully accelerated the run at SVB are not supported by Twitter data evidence.

I expect that the initial set of findings offered in this Preliminary Report may stir reactions. We welcome constructive criticisms and suggestions as to how our ongoing Probative Inquiry may better serve the public good towards which it aims. An Interim Report, to be delivered later this year, will supplement the findings offered here, and a Final Report, to be issued in the early new year, will complete our findings-of-fact. We will seek to capture therein any valuable feedback readers may wish to share with us at [email protected].

 

 

 

Stephen Scott

Founder & CEO

References
  1. Michael S. Barr, Letter of Transmittal to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in Review of the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, April 28, 2023, 1.
  2. Ibid., 4.
  3. Michelle W. Bowman, “Responsive and Responsible Bank Regulation and Supervision,” speech at the Salzburg Global Seminar on Global Turbulence and Financial Resilience: Implications for Financial Services and Society, Salzburg, Austria, June 25 2023, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bowman20230625a.htm.
  4. Contributors to Starling Insights publications (2018 – 2025).
  5. Starling Insights, “Culture & Conduct Risk in the Financial Sector,” The Starling Compendium, (2018–2025).
  6. Starling Insights, “Supervisors on Supervision,” A Starling Insights Deeper Dive report, April 2026.
  7. Addendum Item 4, SVB Directors Statement.

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