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<p><font color="#14ABB2">Probative Inquiry into the <br>2023 Financial Sector Stress Events</font></p><p><font size ="6"><font color="#455664">Re-Examining The Established Public Narrative</font></font></p>

Probative Inquiry into the
2023 Financial Sector Stress Events

Re-Examining The Established Public Narrative

by Starling Insights

Starling Insights Editorial Board

Sep 21, 2026

Feature

Re-Examining the Established Public Narrative

In his opening letter accompanying the Barr Report, then-Vice Chair for Supervision Barr identifies four key causal factors that lay behind the failure of SVB:

  1. SVB’s board of directors and management failed to manage their risks;
  2. Supervisors did not fully appreciate the bank’s vulnerabilities as SVB grew in size and complexity;
  3. When supervisors did identify vulnerabilities, they did not take sufficient steps to ensure that SVB fixed those problems with sufficient alacrity; and
  4. The 2018 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, and a shift in top Fed policymakers’ guidance to supervisors, led to reduced supervisory standards, increased complexity in supervisory practices, and promoted a less assertive supervisory approach.1

The Barr Report was produced by highly experienced senior Fed staff, coordinating work among a number of specialists from across the Fed system, who together compiled an impressively detailed study in what the Report itself calls “a compressed time frame.” With admirable modesty, the Report expressly allows that “further work over a longer period could draw additional or different conclusions.”2 In his covering letter to the Report, then-Vice Chair for Supervision Barr acknowledged that “others will have their own perspectives on this episode,” and indicated that he would “welcome external reviews of SVB’s failure.”3

In that spirit, Starling has sought to study the various findings asserted within the Barr Report, as they are situated within the established public narrative outlined earlier in this present report, and to test those against the public record, internal Fed records, and learnings achieved through interviews with individuals uniquely well-placed to help us to draw constructive lessons from these events.

References
  1. Michael S. Barr, Letter of Transmittal, in Review of the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, 1.
  2. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Preamble, in Review of the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, vii.
  3. Michael S. Barr, Letter of Transmittal, in Review of the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, 4.

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