Probative Inquiry into the
2023 Financial Sector Stress Events
The Established Public Narrative
On April 28th 2023, within weeks of the failure of Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”), the then-Vice Chair for Supervision of the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), Michael S. Barr, published the results of an internal review into the supervision and regulation of SVB (the “Barr Report”).2
That same day, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) published a preliminary review into agency actions related to the March 2023 bank failures.3 And, in September 2023, the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) for the Federal Reserve Board published a related Material Loss Review.4
In October 2023, the international standard-setting community issued its own conclusions. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”) published a “Report on the 2023 Banking Turmoil,”5 and the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) issued its “2023 Bank Failures: Preliminary Lessons Learnt for Resolution.”6
Collectively, these reports form the basis of a public narrative that many consider to be the established narrative; namely, that SVB’s failure was a consequence of:
| 1. | A “textbook case” of mismanagement at the bank, particularly with regard to interest rate and liquidity risks (financial risks); |
| 2. | Management and board failure to maintain effective enterprise risk governance and adequate risk oversight (non-financial risks); |
| 3. | Inability on the part of the Federal Reserve and other supervisors to identify the buildup of potentially ruinous risk at the bank in time to effect remedy; |
| 4. | Undue hesitancy on the part of supervisors to take sufficiently forceful action to compel the bank to remediate risk concerns once they had become evident; |
| 5. | Such hesitancy stemming from the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”), which raised the thresholds for application of Enhanced Prudential Standards, and the Fed’s overly deliberative approach to supervision in a “consensus-driven” work environment; |
| 6. | Uncertainty around senior-level policy priorities, and an excessive focus on due process driven by former Vice Chair for Supervision Randal K. Quarles, which fostered a culture of supervisory timidity; and |
| 7. | A bank run, unprecedented in its speed, “fueled” by social media, a highly networked and concentrated depositor base, and technology changes that facilitated coordinated deposit flight. |
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