Probative Inquiry into the
2023 Financial Sector Stress Events
Examining The Established Public Narrative
Our Probative Inquiry takes these studies as a starting point and seeks to test the reliability of the established public narrative they collectively assert. In so doing, we note at the outset that, while the Barr Report, GAO Report, and OIG Report rely on substantially overlapping factual records, they were prepared for different purposes and emphasize different causal mechanisms:
Despite these differences in causal-weighting, the authors of these reports are broadly consistent in pointing the finger of blame at the board and management of SVB in the first instance.
In his covering letter to the Barr Report, for example, past-VCS Michael Barr insists that “SVBFG’s failure can be tied directly to the failure of the board of directors and senior management,” who “failed to manage their risks.”1 The letter further asserts that the board of SVB “failed to oversee senior leadership and hold them accountable.”2
The OIG Report points to “weaknesses in corporate governance and risk management,”3 asserting that “SVB’s management and board of directors failed to effectively manage SVB’s developing and escalating risks.”4 Moreover, while the board “failed to hold the bank’s leadership accountable for appropriate risk management,” those executives, in turn, “emphasized growth and failed to implement controls.”5
“SVB failed due to ineffective risk management,”6 the GAO asserts. Because the board “did not provide effective oversight” and “did not hold management accountable” for inattention to risk, the GAO concludes that “the bank’s management and board performance needed improvement.”7
The BCBS report highlights the macro-context within which to consider these failures: “The banking turmoil that started in March 2023 is the most significant system-wide banking stress since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) in terms of scale and scope.” The events “triggered a broader crisis of confidence in the resilience of banks, banking systems and financial markets across multiple jurisdictions.”8
At SVB, the BCBS study emphasizes “fundamental shortcomings in basic risk management,” “an excessive focus on growth and short-term profitability … at the expense of appropriate risk management,” “a poor risk culture, as well as ineffective senior management and board oversight,” and “a failure to adequately respond to supervisory feedback and recommendations.”9 Among other factors, this left SVB vulnerable to “highly correlated withdrawals from SVBFG’s concentrated network of VC investors and technology firms who, fuelled by social media, withdrew uninsured deposits in a coordinated manner at an unprecedented rate.”10
For its part, the FSB contends that, “unrealised losses from concentrated bond exposures and liquidity and maturity mismatches during a time of significant monetary tightening, combined with a large proportion of concentrated and uninsured deposits and social media influence, led to the deposit run on SVB.”11 The latter claim receives further attention: “The role of social media in the SVB depositor run illustrates the dynamics that can arise. Social media posts advised depositors to withdraw funds from SVB, and many uninsured depositors did so all at once.”12 Supervisory policy must adapt to such technology-mediated new realities, the FSB asserts.
Since 2023, such findings have been oft-cited. The consistent articulation of these findings, in turn, has led some to insist that there is little reason, today, for us to re-examine the financial sector stress events of 2023.
This report challenges such insistence.
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